Experience Rating, Work Injuries and Benefit Costs : Some New Evidence by Campolieti, Michele et al.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Experience Rating, Work Injuries and Benefit Costs: Some New Evidence"
 
Michele Campolieti, Douglas Hyatt et Terry Thomason
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 61, n° 1, 2006, p. 118-145.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/013723ar
DOI: 10.7202/013723ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 9 février 2017 12:37
118 © RI/IR, 2006, vol. 61, no 1 — ISSN 0034-379X
Experience Rating, Work Injuries 
and Benefit Costs
Some New Evidence
MICHELE CAMPOLIETI
DOUGLAS HYATT
TERRY THOMASON†1*
In 1986, British Columbia’s Workers’ Compensation Board 
introduced an experience rating program that provided a modest 
financial incentive for employers to reduce the costs of claims. 
Using a comprehensive panel data set, we find that claims 
 frequency for health care only and short-term disability claims 
was reduced following the introduction of experience rating. The 
introduction of the program did not affect costs for most claim 
types, except for health care only claims.
Workers’ compensation is a social insurance program that provides for 
medical treatment, vocational rehabilitation and cash benefits to workers 
who have been harmed as the result of an occupational illness or injury, and 
provides cash benefits for the families of workers killed on the job. Akin 
to other government-mandated social insurance programs, these benefits 
are financed by an employer payroll tax. Unlike most other programs, 
however, the rate charged varies across employers as a direct function of 
incurred claims costs.
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An employer’s workers’ compensation assessment rate is determined 
through a two-stage process. In the first stage, the firm is placed in a rate 
group, which reflects underlying injury risks, so that firms with similar risk 
profiles are placed into the same rate group. Rate groups are generally based 
on an industrial sector, reflecting the belief that employees in the same sector 
are exposed to similar risks. A “base” or “manual” rate is established for 
each rate group determined by the collective claims experience of all firms 
in the group. Specifically, the base rate is a function of the entire sector’s 
recent claims cost history. In the second stage, the base rate is further 
 modified according to the individual firm’s own accident experience. Firms 
with “adverse experience” pay a rate that is proportionately higher than the 
base rate, while firms with more favourable experience pay a lower rate. 
These adjustments are referred to as experience rating and are common in 
many insurance plans.
By more closely linking assessments to claims costs, experience 
 rating creates a financial incentive to improve workplace health and safety 
 conditions and has become a cornerstone of occupational health and safety 
policy in North America. Alternatively, experience rating can also increase 
the incentives to reduce claim costs through some sort of claims manage-
ment behaviour, in which employers use other means to reduce claims 
rates and costs.
Studies that have sought to measure the impact of experience  rating 
on the incidence and costs of work injuries do not consistently find a 
 reduction in claims rates or costs associated with experience rating. As 
we will describe, many of the previous studies of experience rating have 
suffered from data limitations including a lack of direct measures of expe-
rience rating, lack of firm-level data, and small sample sizes, all of which 
circumscribe the confidence that researchers and policy makers can place 
on the findings in existing research.
We examine the impact of the introduction of workers’ compensation
experience rating on a panel of employers in British Columbia (BC), 
Canada. Our data set provides measures of claim frequencies and costs 
before and after experience rating and permits us to control for a number of 
other factors that could affect these outcomes over time. We find evidence 
that experience rating leads to a reduction in the frequency of short-term 
disability and health care only claims. In addition, we also find that the 
introduction of the experience rating program was not associated, for the 
most part, with an increase in average cost per claim. Our estimates also 
indicate that the decrease in the claims rate did not offset the increase in 
claim costs for health care costs, which results in an increase in expected 
claim costs per 1,000 workers.
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In the next section we summarize previous studies examining the impact 
of experience rating on workers’ compensation claims activity. We then 
outline the relevant institutional features of the Workers’ Compensation 
Board of British Columbia’s Experience Rated Assessment plan. In the 
fourth section, we describe our data and approaches for estimating the 
impact of experience rating on the frequencies and costs of health care 
only, short-term disability, long-term disability and fatal claims. Estimation 
results are reported in the next section. The paper concludes with some 
summary observations.
EXPERIENCE RATING IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Under strict assumptions,—perfect competition in product and factor 
markets, wage premia for risk that fully reflect the costs of work-related 
injury and disease, and the absence of a market that allows workers to 
purchase their own disability insurance—perfect experience rating is 
 predicted to have no additional impact on improving health and safety 
beyond that induced by compensating wage differentials for risks that arise 
in the labour market. The compensating wage differential fully indemnifies 
workers for work-related health risks and reduces the competitiveness of 
relatively high risk firms. Indeed, if something less than perfect experience 
rating was introduced, such that relatively high-risk employers could pass 
on some of the costs of injury to safer employers, employers may reduce 
their injury prevention investments, with concomitant implications for 
health and safety.
Assuming, however, that wage differentials for risk are not fully 
 compensating, economic theory predicts that experience rating should 
induce employer investments in accident prevention, thereby reducing
the number and costs of injuries (Ruser, 1985). Accordingly, most studies
of experience rating have sought to measure the extent to which the
 frequency of claims or the severity of injuries (usually measured as the 
 duration of absence from work or the cost of a claim) respond to changes
in the magnitudes of the financial incentive. An alternative effect of 
 experience rating programs is that they provide incentives to reduce claim 
costs by discouraging claims by other means (Thomason and Pozzebon, 
2002).
Existing research (including Russell, 1974; Chelius and Smith, 1983; 
Ruser, 1985, 1991, 1993; Harrington, 1988; Worrall and Butler, 1988; 
Moore and Viscusi, 1989), generally finds support for the hypothesis of a 
salutary impact of experience rating on claim frequency. However, some 
of these studies use cross-sectional data and also lack direct measures of 
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the degree of experience rating. As a result, investigators have been forced 
to rely on proxies related to firm size since generally, in the United States, 
the magnitude of the experience rating incentive is positively related to 
firm size. However, it is possible that workplace safety and firm size are 
related for reasons other than experience rating. If, for example, there are 
economies of scale in the provision of safety, then it may be expected 
that large firms will have lower claim rates than small firms, even in the 
absence of experience rating. For example, using longitudinal firm level 
data, Ruser (1985, 1991, 1993) found that claim rates decrease as the size 
of the firm increases.
A handful of longitudinal studies have taken advantage of “natural 
experiments” to compare claim rates before and after the introduction of 
experience rating. While generally supporting the hypothesis that  experience 
rating results in a reduction in the claims rate, these studies are  problematic
because they utilize highly aggregated state/provincial-level data as well 
as industry level data (Bruce and Atkins, 1993; Durbin and Butler, 1998) 
or data from an extremely small number of employers (Chelius and 
Kavanaugh, 1988). In general, the design of the “experiment” in studies 
using aggregate data will consist of “before” and “after” comparisons in 
the pre- and post-intervention outcome measure of interest.
Research examining the relationship between experience rating and 
injury severity has produced results that are less definitive than the claims 
rate studies. Some have found a statistically significant negative relationship 
between experience rating and various measures of injury severity, including 
compensation costs (Butler and Worrall, 1988), and the average duration 
of disability (Chelius and Kavanaugh, 1988). However, most researchers 
have obtained mixed results, including studies by Krueger (1990) and 
Kralj (1995), who examined the relationship between experience rating
and claim duration, Thomason (1993), who estimated regressions
predicting the probability of permanent disability, and Ruser (1993), who 
investigated the incidence of claims classified by severity. In addition, 
the severity studies suffer from methodological problems similar to those 
that plague the claims rate research. In general, the research examin-
ing the relationship between experience rating and injury severity has 
produced mixed results. Reviews of the evidence have determined that, 
“from the existing body of research, we cannot conclude that workers’ 
 compensation premiums  provide effective incentives to reduce workplace 
hazards” (Boden, 1995: 287) and “[b]ecause the workers’ compensation 
system provides generalized, financial incentives, the failure to clearly 
associate declines in risk with increases in injury costs is disappointing”
(Smith, 1992: 581).
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EXPERIENCE RATING IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
The data for this study come from the province of British Columbia, 
Canada. In this section we describe the salient features of the workers’ 
compensation system in British Columbia, with particular emphasis on the 
nature and magnitudes of the financial incentives created by its experience 
rating initiative.
The workers’ compensation program in British Columbia is exclusively 
administered by a provincial agency, the Workers’ Compensation Board 
(WCB). The WCB provides injured workers with cash benefits, medical 
and vocational rehabilitation services. Cash benefits are paid to workers 
who have suffered a work disability resulting from a workplace injury 
or illness and to the families of workers who were killed in industrial 
 accidents. Disabled workers may receive short- or long-term disability 
benefits. Short-term (STD) benefits are paid to claimants beginning the 
day after injury up until the point at which their medical condition has 
stabilized, or the worker returns to work, whichever comes first. Weekly 
STD benefits are equal to 75 percent of the claimant’s pre-injury weekly 
wage (gross of taxes). Long-term (LTD) benefits to claimants who have 
suffered a permanent consequence, such as an amputated limb, are paid in 
one of two forms: a lifetime pension based on a “meat” chart or wage loss 
benefits (75 percent of pre-injury earnings) until age 65.1 The claimant 
would receive whichever of the two alternatives was larger. In addition, 
STD benefits are also subject to maximum and minimum payments, so 
that the actual replacement rate for earnings may differ from the statutory 
replacement rate for some workers.
Benefits are financed by employer assessments that are equal to the 
product of the firm’s assessable payroll and the applicable assessment rate.2
In 1986, the Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia introduced 
a new experience rating regime, called the Experience Rated Assessment 
plan (ERA). Before 1986, experience rating was limited to employers in 
the logging, construction, forest products, and metal mining industries. 
Other firms were not experience rated. In contrast, ERA applied to all 
1. The value of benefits has changed since the end of our study period. 
2. The assessment rate is expressed as the number of dollars in premiums per hundred dollars 
of assessable payroll. Employee salaries are assessable up to a maximum wage, which 
in 1992 was equal to $48,000 per annum. It should be noted that in the U.S., rates are 
adjusted by a number of additional factors, including modifications for firm size, premium 
discounts, schedule rating, dividends and other factors outlined in Thomason, Schmidle 
and Burton (2001, Appendix C).
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compulsory rated firms, regardless of size or industry.3 The ERA plan in 
British Columbia differs from those in other Canadian provinces, which 
often exclude small employers and may also have different experience 
 rating programs for different industries, since it applies to all industries 
and employers.
Implementation of ERA was staggered so that the plan was first applied, 
in 1986, to most of the firms in previously experience-rated industries as 
well as to heavy manufacturing and trucking industries. With the exception
of farming, ERA was introduced to all other firms beginning in 1987. 
Farming was introduced to ERA in 1988. Finally, firm premiums in the ERA 
plan are fully or partially adjusted depending on industry and assessable 
payroll (or the number of years that the firm has been registered with the 
WCB). Farms participate at the 25 percent level. Firms other than farming 
operations participate at the 50 percent level if they have one year or less 
of assessable payroll or if total assessable payroll over the past two years 
is less than the total of two times the maximum assessable wage rate. All 
other firms participate at the 100 percent level.
ERA adjusts base manual rates according to the following formula:
 R = B × [1 + (L*E)] (1)
where R is the ERA-adjusted rate, B is the base rate, L is the participation 
level (equal to 1, 0.5, or 0.25), and E is the adjustment factor, also known 
as the firm variance, which is equal to:
 E = (Rf – Rs)/Rs (2)
where Rf is the firm ratio, defined as the ratio of firm claim costs to 
firm  payroll and Rs is the industry ratio, defined as the ratio of industry 
claim costs to industry payroll. Claim cost and payroll data are calculated 
 annually, based on claims that were initiated during the two previous years. 
Importantly, claim costs are limited to those paid within a 30-month “review 
period”; that is, all costs paid during the two previous years up until June 30 
of the third year.4 These costs include the capitalized value of any permanent 
3. The Workers’ Compensation Act of British Columbia distinguishes firms for whom 
 coverage is required and those for whom coverage is voluntary or noncompulsory. Over 
the period relevant to our data, noncompulsory firms included banks, insurance companies, 
and law, accounting, medical and dental offices.
4. Other experience rating programs in Canada vary the length of assessment period. With 
the exception of Manitoba, which only uses the previous year, most plans use claim costs 
from the previous three years. Generally speaking, the plans in the provinces of Alberta, 
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island are fairly similar 
in structure to the ERA program. However, the ERA plan in BC applies to all employers, 
while the plans in other provinces tend to exclude small firms (Workers’ Compensation 
Board of British Columbia, 1997). 
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disability pensions awarded during this period, but not if the permanent 
disability pension is awarded after the period. An administrative inventory 
(Hunt, 1992: 46) that considered the ERA formula noted:
This means that long duration claims will not count against an employer’s 
ERA merit/demerit beyond the two-and-one-half-year maximum period. It 
also means that if inefficient claims adjudication, slow medical recovery, or 
employer stalling with appeal procedures delays the award of a pension beyond 
the two-and-one-half year period from the date of injury, this amount will not 
count against the employer’s experience rating evaluation.
The ERA program sets the maximum adjustment factor, E, to between 
plus and minus 33 percent.5 This indicates that firm accident experience 
may affect the assessment rate by as much as two-thirds of the base rate. 
For example, if the base rate is $3.00 per $100 of payroll, then an employer 
may pay as little as $2.00 or as much as $4.00 per $100 of payroll, based 
on their own accident experience. Compared to experience rating plans in 
the United States where it is possible for a firm to be “self-rated” so that 
there is, essentially, a one-to-one relationship between benefit payments and 
compensation costs, ERA has a limited “bite”. On the other hand, unlike the 
U.S. experience rating program, ERA applies to firms of all sizes.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The data used in the analyses that follow were drawn from a file created 
by the Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia. This database of 
firms, from 1983 to 1992 inclusive, was compiled from the administrative 
records of the WCB and contains information regarding the number and cost 
of claims by type, firm assessable payroll, whether the firm participated in 
ERA, and the rate group to which the firm belongs. In addition, the WCB 
added information on the industry average wage rate. For the purposes of 
our analysis, we limited the data to firms which had not been experience-
rated prior to the introduction of ERA and which had employed five or 
more persons each year during the reference period, yielding a final data 
set of 4,293 firms.6
Four types of claim rates are examined: (1) claims where the claim-
ant did not experience work disability and, therefore, only received health 
5. Prior to ERA, the experience rating program that covered firms in the logging, construc-
tion, forestry and metal work groups allowed for more modest merit and demerit adjust-
ments. In particular, the merits and demerits, depending on the industry, ranged from 30 
to 39 percent. However, the inclusion window varied from 3 to 7 years, depending on 
the industry.
6. Only 412 of these firms entered the ERA program in 1986, the rest entered in 1987.
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care benefits (HCO); (2) claims where the claimant experienced short-term 
 disability (STD), but suffered no permanent consequence; (3) claims where 
the claimant experienced long-term (i.e., permanent) disability (LTD); and, 
(4) fatalities. We also studied the total claims rate. For any claim type, the 
claims rate represents the annual number of that particular type of claim 
per 1,000 workers.
Because we observe information on multiple firms over a number of 
years, we estimate a panel data version of a Poisson regression model:
where yit is the number of compensation claims experienced by the ith firm 
during the tth year, Pit is a dummy variable indicating whether the ith firm 
participated in the ERA program during the tth year, and xit is a vector of 
explanatory variables. The term denotes an industry specific fixed effect.
Our key independent variable, participation (Pit), takes the value one 
if the firm participated in the ERA program, and zero otherwise. Because 
the overwhelming majority of firms in our sample participate in ERA at 
the 100 percent level, we are unable to exploit variation in the participation 
level as an additional route for examining the impact of ERA.
Weekly benefits may affect both firm and worker behaviour. Holding 
other factors constant, higher weekly benefits would increase claims by 
workers and should produce a positive sign on this control. On the other 
hand, higher benefit levels also encourage employers to take greater 
 precautions and to invest in health and safety. Alternatively, employers may 
also challenge some claims or also discourage workers from filing claims 
by providing light duties or other special work arrangements (Thomason 
and Pozzebon, 2002). These behaviours would tend to suggest a negative 
sign on the benefit variable. As a result, the a priori effect of benefits is 
indeterminate. However, most empirical evidence suggests that the effects 
on worker behaviour dominate.
Expected weekly benefits were based on the estimated average firm 
wage. This variable was calculated using the limit factor method, an actuarial 
technique used by the National Council of Compensation Insurers.7 We 
controlled for the effects of benefits in our empirical models by including
the level of benefits and its square. The benefits squared term is included 
to capture any nonlinearities in the relationship between benefits and claim 
7. This method require a wage distribution, which we obtained using data from the 1988-90 
Labour Market Activity Survey conducted by Statistics Canada.
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rates. This sort of specification has been frequently used in the literature 
(e.g., among others, Ruser, 1991, 1993).
Another factor that can affect claims is the average wage paid by the 
firm. If wages are a measure of the worker’s opportunity cost of disability,
this variable should be negatively related to the claims rate and costs. 
However, the wage variable may also be positively related to injuries since 
workers require compensating differentials to undertake more hazardous 
jobs. Like benefits, it is not possible to determine an a priori sign on the 
effect of wages.
We also included two variables related to firm size in our model. We 
control for firm size using the firm’s payroll and include a measure of 
payroll growth in our empirical specification. The firm’s payroll is the 
appropriate measure of firm size in British Columbia because firms are 
classified on the basis of their payroll. The a priori effect of payroll size 
on claim rates is indeterminate for a number of reasons. First, it is possible
that there are economies of scale in accident prevention or claims manage-
ment behaviour such that larger employers will secure a greater return for 
each dollar spent than similarly situated smaller firms. Second, to the extent 
that larger firms make greater investments in human capital, it might be 
expected that they will more zealously defend that investment by making 
correspondingly greater investments in accident prevention than smaller 
employers. On the other hand, since larger firms are more likely to be 
unionized than smaller firms, we can expect that workers in large firms 
will have a better understanding of their rights under the law and will be 
less fearful of employer retaliation if they should file a workers’ compensa-
tion claim, which suggests there should be more claims filed in these large 
unionized firms (Hirsch, MacPherson and Dumond, 1997). Consequently, 
the effect of payrolls, our control for firm size, is indeterminate. We entered 
payroll as a quadratic in our models because some previous research has 
found some evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship between payrolls 
and claim rates.
Payroll growth may also affect the claims rate. As firms hire new 
employees, the number of young and inexperienced workers increases 
proportionally. To the extent that these workers may be more likely to be 
injured at work, then the claims rate should similarly increase. As the firm’s 
workforce contracts, seniority systems are likely to reverse this process, 
so that workers with less tenure will be laid off, reducing the proportion 
of less experienced workers. For these reasons, payroll growth should 
be positively related to the claims rate. On the other hand, older workers 
recover less quickly from the effects of injury and are more likely to suffer
permanent consequences, so that we would expect that payroll growth would 
 differentially affect the long-term disability claims rate.
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Finally, the annual provincial unemployment rate by NAICS (North 
American Industry Classification System) industry sector for prime age 
males (25 to 54) was included to capture the effects of general economic 
activity. We matched the firms in our data to 16 NAICS industry sectors. 
The unemployment rate was entered in the model by taking the difference
between the level of the unemployment rate in each sector and its average
during the study period. As the economy expands, firms will book more 
orders and, consequently, hire more workers, work longer hours, and work 
more intensively during those hours. At a micro level, workers might have 
an incentive to file claims if they anticipate a layoff or a deterioration in 
 economic conditions (Fortin and Lanoie, 1992). This may be  particularly true 
for injuries that occurred with a previous employer in British Columbia.
In addition to the claims rate analysis, we also estimate average cost 
per claim regressions for each claim type as well as regressions for the 
average duration of short-term disability claims. Fixed effects Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) regression procedures were used for these analyses. 
We include the same independent variables as in the claims rate equations 
and, in general, expect the same directional relationships.
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of the dependent 
and explanatory variables used in these regressions. There were 126 claims 
per year for every 1,000 workers in our sample. Of the non-fatal claims, 
the most common was for short-term disability (64.4 per 1,000 workers), 
followed by health care only claims (60.5 per 1,000 workers), and long-
term disability claims (1.3 per 1,000 workers). Long-term disability claims 
were by far the most expensive, averaging $30,071 per claim. Short-term 
disability claims averaged $1,807 and the mean health care only claim cost 
$83. The overall average cost of a claim was $1,381. The average worker in 
our sample received benefits of $303.08 per week, and received short-term 
disability benefits for 23.5 days. The average firm paid a weekly wage of 
$419, had a payroll of $1,605,611 and experienced payroll growth of about 
8.9 percent per year.
Figure 1 shows average annual total, health care only and short-
term disability claim rates for the firms in our sample, relative to initial 
 participation in ERA. The data have been normalized by the firm’s claims 
rate during the initial year of participation (i.e., at time 0), so that all claims 
rates are equal to 100. For example, the far left-most data points depict 
claims rates two years prior to ERA implementation, while the right-hand-
most data points show the claims rates five years after the introduction of 
ERA.
These data suggest that the total claims rate as well as the HCO and 
STD claims rates were higher in the period prior to the implementation of 
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TABLE 1
Variable Means and Standard Deviations (Firm Level Data)
Variable Name Mean
Standard
Deviation
Participation 0.6770 0.468
Weekly benefit 303.0800 54.600
Wage 418.9400 102.300
Payroll (‘000) 1,605.6100 9,924.680
Payroll growth 0.0890 0.202
Unemployment Rate Variable (deviation of prime 
age unemployment rate for prime males by NAICS 
sector from historical mean for sector)
–5.4E-5 2.420
Unemployment Rate by NAICS sector 9.5700 2.420
Total claims rate 126.1500 168.010
Health care only claims rate 60.4500 95.140
Short-term disability claims rate 64.3500 102.610
Long-term disability claims rate 1.2930 8.886
Fatal claims rate 0.0545 1.958
Total cost per claim 1381.4400 5622.160
Cost per health care only claim 83.0500 112.700
Cost per short-term disability claim 1806.6100 3088.950
Cost per long-term disability claim 30,071.3000 50,764.400
Claim duration (days per claim) 23.4860 34.676
ERA than afterward. In particular, the data indicate that the claims rate fell 
immediately upon the introduction of experience rating. The claims rates for 
health care only claims rose subsequently—as did the total claims rate—to 
pre-ERA levels and then fell again after three years. The STD claims rate 
continued to fall for two years after ERA implementation, and then rose in 
the third year following initial participation. The STD rate fell once again 
in the fifth year following ERA implementation.
It is important to note that the WCB does not collect data on firm 
employment, so that claims rates were calculated using an estimate of 
firm employment provided by the WCB. The WCB’s estimate was derived 
using average industry wage rates from Statistics Canada as an estimate of 
firm wage rates. Employment was determined by dividing firm-reported 
annual assessable payroll by these estimated wage rates. Admittedly, this 
is a flawed measure of employment and, consequently, the claims rate, so 
both variables may be measured with some error. The data may also have 
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a bias against high-wage employers because the wage data from Statistics 
Canada are not right-censored, but workers’ compensation data on firm 
payroll are, which will tend to reduce the size of high-wage employers 
relative to low-wage employers.
Since we had to rely on industry level wages to proxy for firm level 
wages, within-industry clustering of the errors in our firm-level estimates is 
likely. The central consequence of this clustering is that the standard errors 
in the firm-level analysis will be underestimated.8 Therefore, we have aggre-
gated our data to the industry level. In the next section, we present results for 
both the industry-level analysis and the firm-level analysis. We believe that 
the standard errors from the industry level analysis are more likely to reflect 
the true statistical significance of our results. As a consequence, we will 
emphasize the industry-level analyses in the discussion of our results.9
RESULTS
Claims Frequency Analysis Using Industry Level Data
We estimate the impact of ERA on claims frequencies using a Poisson 
specification. The parameter estimates for the Poisson model in Table 2a, 
based on the industry-level data, suggest that participation in ERA has the 
expected negative effect on total claims—reducing the number of total 
claims by 8.1 percent. This includes an 8.3 percent reduction in health care 
only claims, an 8.5 percent reduction in the short-term disability rate, but a 
33.3 percent increase in the rate of long-term disability claims. The point 
estimate from the fatal claims regression is not significantly different from 
zero at conventional probability levels.The lack of a statistically  significant 
effect of the ERA program on fatal claims may be attributable to two 
 factors. First, there are only a (relatively) small number of fatality claims, 
so it might be difficult to isolate the effect of ERA on the incidence of these 
claims. Second, in British Columbia, the fatality claims are assigned to the 
year the claim is accepted, not when the death is reported. This can lead to 
measurement problems with fatalities arising from industrial diseases.
8. Wooldridge (2003) discussed how an appropriate adjustment could be made to pooled 
OLS standard errors when group level information is combined with individual level 
information. However, we are not aware of any econometric procedures for a similar 
adjustment in nonlinear models or panel models, akin to our specification.
9. The industry level of aggregation we choose was the “rate group”. In British Columbia, 
rate groups are similar to an industrial classification. The firms in a rate group carry 
out the same sorts of operations and in British Columbia, are also members of the same 
industrial classification.
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The claims rate results indicate that participation in ERA affects claim 
distribution, decreasing the probability of less serious claims (health care 
only and short-term disability), while increasing the probability of more 
serious claims. A plausible explanation for this result may be due to the 
incentives of the ERA program. Recall that under the ERA formula, claim 
costs, including the capitalized costs of long-term disability pensions, are 
only included in the calculation of the experience rating adjustment factor 
if those costs are incurred within the 30-month review period. According 
to Workers’ Compensation Board of British Columbia statistics, less than 
half of long-term disability benefit costs are assessed in the first three years 
following the date of injury (i.e., a substantial proportion of workers are 
not evaluated for their long-term disability benefit until after the 30-month 
cost review window), suggesting that only a fraction of long-term  disability
costs are assessed to the individual employer’s accident cost record for 
experience rating purposes. Thus, one interpretation of our results is that 
the 30-month cost window of ERA creates an incentive for employers to 
engage in some sort of claims management behaviour in which they dispute 
long-term disability claims (resulting from injuries that may be difficult to 
diagnose or attribute to the workplace, such as back injuries and other soft-
tissue and musculoskeletal problems—which can be 40 to 50 percent of 
claims) and try to mask the incidence of relatively minor health care only 
and short-term disability claims (i.e., less severe injuries). This is consistent
with the observations in Ison (1986) and Kralj (2000), who discuss some 
of the unintended consequences of experience rating. Specifically, some 
employers might engage in claims management practices, which involve 
accommodating workers with some injuries, vigorously protesting and 
appealing other sorts of injuries, prompt reporting and monitoring the 
recuperation or rehabilitation process, in an effort to reduce their workers’ 
compensation costs (Thomason and Pozzebon, 2002). In addition, Hyatt 
and Kralj (1995) found, in their empirical study using data from Ontario, 
that experience-rated employers were more likely to appeal claims than 
non-experience-rated employers.
The estimates on the linear benefit term were negative and statistically 
significant for all the claim types except the long-term disability and fatality 
claims. The squared benefit variable was positive for all claim types, but 
not statistically significant in the long-term disability and fatality claims 
regressions. The difference in the magnitude of the estimates on the linear 
and squared benefit terms indicates that the linear term, which has a negative 
sign, will offset the squared term. This suggests that the effect of benefits 
on firm behaviour (e.g., more investments in safety or increased contesting 
of claims) dominate the effects on worker behaviour. The wage variable 
was not statistically significant in any of the regressions.
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The linear term for payroll size was positively related to the incidence 
of claims in most of the Poisson regression models we estimated in Table 
2a, but the squared value of payroll variable was negative. The exception 
was the health care only regression, in which the pattern was reversed. With 
the exception of the coefficient on the payroll-squared term in the fatality 
regression, the estimates on the payroll and its square were  statistically 
significant. However, the estimate on the squared term was quite small, 
suggesting that a linear relationship between payroll and claims rates 
dominates. Our estimates imply that as payrolls increase, the total number 
of claims increases, but at a decreasing rate.
TABLE 2a
Fixed Effect Poisson Model Estimates of Injury Claim Rates, Based on 
Industry Level Data
Claim Type
Total
Claims
Health-Care
Only
Short-term
Disability
Long-term
Disability
Fatality
Participation –8.113***
 (9.98)
–8.313***
 (6.67)
–8.546***
 (7.89)
0033.317***
00 (4.09)
–12.80
0 (0.25)
Benefits –1.203***
 (8.56)
–1.769***
 (7.97)
–0.822***
 (4.48)
00–1.546
00 (1.09)
0–2.104
0 (0.26)
Benefits Squared 00.001***
 (6.68)
00.002***
 (6.57)
00.001***
 (3.27)
0000.002
00 (0.78)
000.003
0 (0.26)
Wages –0.008
 (0.45)
–0.031
 (1.07)
–0.003
 (0.10)
0000.200
00 (1.08)
000.728
0 (0.78)
Payroll
(‘000000)
00.012***
 (2.65)
–0.027***
 (3.96)
00.036***
 (6.19)
0000.122***
00 (2.93)
000.762**
0 (2.09)
Payroll Squared –2.0E-8***
 (2.70)
03.6E-8***
 (3.06)
–5.3E-8***
 (5.31)
00–2.4E-8***
00 (3.35)
0–9.1E-7
0 (0.47)
Payroll Growth 06.368
 (1.61)
14.25**
 (2.40)
01.088
 (0.20)
–124.5***
00 (3.59)
011.08
0 (0.07)
Unemployment
Rate
–0.587***
 (4.36)
–0.784***
 (3.91)
–0.453**
 (2.46)
0000.399
00 (0.31)
–11.10
0 (1.31)
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.  * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
** denotes significance at 5 percent level.  *** denotes significance at 1 percent level.
Payroll growth has a positive and statistically significant relation-
ship to the frequency of health care only claims. Notable, however, is the 
 statistically significant but negative estimate on the payroll growth variable 
in the long-term disability model. These estimates suggest that as payrolls 
increase and, consequently, employment increases, the incidence of long-
term disability claims declines, which is contrary to our expectations. This 
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finding may be due to the possibility that, in the face of increased demand, 
employers may either increase employment or the hours worked by the 
existing workforce. By increasing employment, firms reduce the probability 
of a claim by reducing the average burden of each employee. On the other 
hand, changes in payroll may be a poor proxy for changes in employment 
because they may also reflect wage increases.
Finally, our parameter estimates for the unemployment rate were 
 negative whenever they were statistically significant (specifically in the 
total claims, health care only and short-term disability claims regressions). 
The estimate on the unemployment variable for long-term disability claims 
had a positive sign, which could be interpreted as suggesting that the more 
severe injuries may increase during periods of economic contractions. 
However, this estimate is not statistically significant.
Claims Frequency Analysis Using Firm Level Data
We also estimated Poisson regression models for the firm level 
data. These results are presented in Table 2b. The coefficients on the 
 participation variable, estimated using the firm level data, are larger for total 
claims, health care only and short-term disability claims, than are those in
Table 2a, based on industry-level data. Based on firm-level data (industry-
level results in brackets), total claims, health care only and short-term dis-
ability claims decreased by 21.4 (8.1), 24.4 (8.3) and 20.0 (8.5) percent,
respectively, following the introduction of ERA. In addition, the ERA 
 program was associated with a 23.8 percent increase (33.3 percent increase) 
in long-term disability claims. The estimate in the fatality claims regression 
was not statistically significant using either the firm-level or industry-level 
data.
Most of the estimates on the other control variables were similar to 
those in Table 2a. The signs of the effects do not, for the most part, differ 
between the industry and firm level analyses. However, as with the impact 
of ERA, the magnitudes differ somewhat. A notable exception is the rela-
tionship between payroll size and claims frequency. For the firm-level 
analyses, the signs of the coefficients on payroll and payroll squared reveal 
a U-shaped relationship to each of the claims types (though both coefficients 
are statistically insignificant in the fatal claims regression).
Claim Costs Using Industry Level Data
Our expectations with respect to benefits and wages are similar to those 
from the claims incidence analysis. We have no particular expectation with 
respect to payroll levels, but we hypothesize that payroll growth will be 
Campolieti pages 118.indd 133     2006-05-16 10:49:53   
134 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2006, VOL. 61, No 1
negatively related to claim costs and days lost, since increased employment 
will reflect a younger workforce that is less susceptible to the effects of 
workplace injuries. The provincial unemployment rate by NAICS industrial 
sector should be positively related to claim costs and days lost because an 
increase in the unemployment rate reflects a reduction in the opportunity 
costs of disability.
GLS fixed effects estimates of claims costs based upon industry-level 
data are reported in the four left-hand-most columns of Table 3a. The 
 participation variable is associated with an increase of $275.09 in total claim 
costs, $41.09 in health care only claim costs, $19.47 in short-term disability 
costs and $2,067.79 in long-term disability claim costs. However, only the 
estimate for the health care only claims was statistically significant. Most 
of the other explanatory variables were not statistically significant in the 
industry level analysis.
TABLE 2b
Fixed Effect Poisson Model Estimates of Injury Claim Rates,
Based on Firm Level Data
Claim Type
Total Claims Health-Care
Only
Short-term
Disability
Long-term
Disability
Fatality
Participation –21.408***
 (32.24)
–24.449***
 (24.02)
–20.000***
 (22.59)
23.867***
 (3.57)
007.614
0 (0.17)
Benefits 0–1.503***
 (12.60)
0–2.152***
 (11.37)
0–1.036***
0 (6.66)
–1.183
 (1.00)
–13.481**
0 (1.98)
Benefits
Squared
0 0.002***
 (10.41)
0 0.003***
0 (9.86)
0 0.001***
0 (5.19)
00.001
 (0.27)
000.017*
0 (1.83)
Wages 0–0.048***
0 (3.23)
0–0.111***
0 (4.79)
0–0.012
0 (0.58)
00.230*
 (1.70)
000.646
0 (0.91)
Payroll
(‘000000)
0–0.028***
0 (9.52)
0–0.035***
0 (7.37)
0–0.024***
0 (6.23)
–0.060**
 (2.08)
000.077
0 (0.16)
Payroll
Squared
0 2.8E-10***
0 (6.76)
0 2.9E-10***
0 (4.70)
0 2.8E-10***
0 (5.06)
08.9E-10**
 (2.19)
0–2.7E-9
0 (0.47)
Payroll Growth 0–0.859
0 (0.82)
0 1.734
0 (1.12)
0–2.004
0 (1.41)
–69.034***
 (5.53)
–74.465
0 (1.18)
Unemployment
Rate
0–0.387***
0 (3.21)
0–2.289
0 (1.28)
0–0.534***
0 (3.24)
00.866
 (0.78)
0–2.34
0 (0.35)
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
** denotes significance at 5 percent level. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level.
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TABLE 3a
Fixed Effect Regression Estimates of Average Claim Costs,
Based on Industry Level Data
Claim Type
Total Claims Health-Care
Only
Short-term
Disability
Long-term
Disability
Duration
Participation 0275.09
00 (1.29)
041.09***
0 (3.27)
0019.47
00 (0.16)
002067.79
0000 (1.01)
00.668
 (0.53)
Benefits 0–27.286
00 (0.85)
003.689*
0 (1.90)
0–19.062
00 (1.01)
000517.64
0000 (1.48)
00.125
 (0.65)
Benefits Squared 0000.047
00 (1.08)
0–0.004
0 (1.49)
0000.040
00 (1.56)
0000–0.796*
0000 (1.66)
–0.0003
 (0.12)
Wages 00–0.046
00 (0.01)
0–0.800***
0 (3.09)
00–4.999*
00 (1.94)
000022.78
0000 (0.53)
–0.049*
 (1.89)
Payroll
(‘000000)
0271.0
00 (1.11)
005.690
0 (0.40)
0208.1
00 (1.46)
000639.9
0000 (0.35)
03.180**
 (2.20)
Payroll Squared 00–4.7E-6
00 (1.06)
0–7.8E-8
0 (0.30)
00–3.5E-6
00 (1.32)
0000–8.2E-6
0000 (3.35)
–5.3E-8**
 (1.99)
Payroll Growth –796.2
00 (1.08)
–50.370
0 (1.17)
–325.3
00 (0.73)
–19593.4***
0000 (2.70)
–6.470
 (1.44)
Unemployment
Rate
0049.305
00 (1.09)
008.218***
0 (3.10)
0049.803*
00 (1.88)
00–179.89
0000 (0.45)
00.605**
 (2.25)
# of observations 391 385 387 276 387
# of industries 49 49 49 44 49
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.  * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
** denotes significance at 5 percent level.  *** denotes significance at 1 percent level.
Claims Costs Using Firm Level Data
We also estimated our cost regressions using the firm level data, 
the results of which are presented in the four left-hand-most columns of
Table 3b. Sample size varies by claim type, since individual year observa-
tions for firms were dropped from the sample if they failed to experience 
any claims of that type during the year—that is, years in which a firm 
incurred zero claim costs for a particular type of claim during a specific 
year were dropped from the sample of observations used to estimate the 
cost-regression for that claim-type. In other words, we are interested in the 
effect of ERA on claim costs conditional on the firm having claims. We 
again include the same independent variables in these regressions as in the 
claims rate analysis.
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TABLE 3b
Fixed Effect Regression Estimates of Average Claim Costs,
Based on Firm Level Data
Claim Type
Total
Claims
Health-Care
Only
Short-term
Disability
Long-term
Disability
Duration
Participation 0398.72***
0 (32.24)
020.44***
0 (7.36)
0238.58***
00 (3.37)
1662.26
00 (0.32)
04.656***
 (5.72)
Benefits 00–2.132
00 (0.10)
000.362
0 (0.68)
00–3.188
00 (0.24)
1372.7
00 (1.31)
00.170
 (1.98)
Benefits Squared 0000.006
00 (0.18)
0–0.001
0 (0.79)
0000.020
0 0(0.99)
00–2.184
00 (1.51)
–0.0001
 (0.54)
Wages 00–0.371
00 (0.14)
000.001
0 (0.02)
00–4.175**
00 (2.52)
0147.49
00 (1.41)
–0.028
 (1.47)
Payroll
(‘000000)
0008.070
00 (0.38)
001.040**
0 (2.29)
0003.050
00 (0.26)
00–0.001
00 (1.56)
00.017
 (0.13)
Payroll Squared
(‘000000)
00–4.3E-9
00 (0.12)
0–1.2E-9
0 (1.53)
00–2.6E-9
00 (0.13)
0004.8E-7
00 (1.12)
–3.5E-12
 (0.47)
Payroll Growth –500.1***
00 (3.02)
–11.30***
0 (2.81)
–511.2***
00 (5.05)
1225.0
00 (0.13)
–5.011
 (4.31)
Unemployment
Rate
0–35.585*
00 (1.74)
0–0.043
0 (0.09)
0–45.37***
00 (3.64)
1084.6
00 (1.23)
00.452
 (3.16)
# of observations 26,158 20,930 20,354 2,094 20,547
# of firms 4,088 3,882 3,778 999 3,779
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. * denotes significance at
10 percent level.  ** denotes significance at 5 percent level.  *** denotes 
 significance at 1 percent level.
The magnitudes and statistical significance of the impact of experience 
rating differ from the industry-level estimates in Table 3a. In Table 3b, 
for the firm level data, ERA participation is associated with an increase 
of $20.44 in the average cost of a health care only claim and a $238.58 
increase in the average cost of a short-term disability claim (both statistically 
significant). The average cost of a long-term disability claim falls after 
the introduction of experience rating, but this estimate is not statistically 
significant. Overall, the cost of the average workers’ compensation claim 
increased by a statistically significant $398.72 following experience rating.
Taken together with the reduction in claims rates associated with ERA that 
was reported in the previous section, the cost results suggest that firms 
reduce the incidence of relatively low cost claims.
The estimate on benefits and the squared value of benefits are not 
statistically significant. We also found that most of the estimates on wages 
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are not statistically significant. The only exception was the estimate on the 
costs of short-term disability, which was significantly negative. Payroll 
levels are positively related to claim costs for most claim types, although 
this relationship is not statistically significant in any of our specifications. 
On the other hand, payroll growth is negatively related to claim costs for 
all types of claims, except for long-term disability claims. Finally, our 
 coefficient estimates for the unemployment rate were negative for total, 
health care only and long-term disability costs, but positive for short-term 
disability costs. The estimate on the unemployment rate for short-term 
disability costs was significant at the 1 percent level, while that for total 
claims was only significant at the 10 percent level.
In general, our findings suggest that the firm level data place an 
[upward] bias on the impact of ERA on expected claim costs. Moreover, 
the standard errors in the firm level cost analysis, as well as the claims 
analysis, may also have a downward bias. This implies that the industry 
level estimates may be the preferred estimates of the impact of ERA on 
claim costs and rates in British Columbia.
Claim Duration
The right hand-most column of Table 3b presents fixed effects 
 regression results for the average duration (in days) of short-term disability 
claims using firm level data, for firms that experienced at least one short-
term disability claim during a particular year. These estimates indicate that 
the average duration of a short-term disability claim increased by about
4.7 days per claim following the introduction of ERA. This is consistent with 
our finding that the average cost of short-term disability claims increased 
after the introduction of ERA, and further suggests that firms reduced 
the number of relatively low-cost claims. Thus, the remaining short-term 
 disability claims would be those of relatively higher cost (one might think 
of these as claims arising from relatively more severe injuries).10 However, 
our estimate is much smaller (0.7 days) and not statistically significant 
when we used the industry level data (see Table 3a).
The Impact of ERA on Workers’ Compensation Costs
Our estimates suggest that ERA is generally associated with a reduction 
in workers’ compensation claims frequency and an increase in the average
10. We estimated regressions rather than hazard models because we only had data on the 
average number of days lost to work-related injuries for a firm, not the actual number 
of days for an individual at a firm.
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cost of a claim.11 A remaining question is whether the reduction in frequency 
is sufficient to offset the increases in the average claims cost, thereby 
 reducing workers’ compensation system costs?
To address this question, we constructed a new dependent variable
—claims cost per 1,000 workers—and re-estimated the cost equations. Table 
4a shows the results of this analysis, based upon estimates using industry-
level data. The ERA participation variable is statistically significant in the 
health care only regression, where the health care costs per 1,000 workers 
increased by $4,548 following the introduction of experience rating. The 
ERA participation dummy was not statistically significant in any of the 
total cost regressions for the other claim types.
TABLE 4a
Fixed Effect Regression Estimates of Claim Costs per 1,000 Workers,
Based on Industry Level Data
Claim Type
Total Claims Health-Care 
Only
Short-term
Disability
Long-term
Disability
Participation  –24,192.51
      (0.58)
4,548.31***
   (2.78)
–28,690
     (1.48)
  27,492.91
      (1.18)
Benefits   –9,134.47
      (1.45)
  413.68
   (1.63)
 –6,547.26**
     (2.24)
   6,106.07
      (1.52)
Benefits Squared       13.867
      (1.61)
   –0.437
   (1.27)
      9.52**
     (2.38)
      –8.99
      (1.64)
Wages      444.49
      (0.45)
  –91.67
   (2.72)
    318.80
     (0.79)
    –101.13
      (0.21)
Payroll
(‘000000)
       0.068
      (1.44)
   –0.000
   (0.14)
      0.036
     (1.60)
      –0.007
      (0.31)
Payroll Squared       –1.12E-9
      (0.15)
   –5.06E-12
   (0.15)
     –5.6E-10
     (5.31)
       9.84E-11
      (0.26)
Payroll Growth –134,821.70
      (0.93)
 –518.16
   (0.09)
 16,779.93
     (0.24)
–223,454.90***
      (2.69)
Unemployment
Rate
   5,196.73
      (0.59)
1.193.95***
   (3.46)
  4,607.97
     (1.12)
   1.296.36
      (0.28)
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.  * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
** denotes significance at 5 percent level.  *** denotes significance at 1 percent level.
The analysis based on the firm-level data, presented in Table 4b, 
 indicates statistically significant increases in the costs per 1,000 workers 
11. On a related note, there has been an increase in health care costs in many jurisdic-
tions.
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of all claims combined, health care only and short-term disability (at the
10 percent level) following the introduction of ERA. Similar to our 
 findings for the average claim cost analysis (Tables 3a and 3b), the firm-
level data appears to yield a larger impact of ERA on claims costs per
1,000  workers.
TABLE 4b
Fixed Effect Regression Estimates of Claim Costs per 1,000 Workers,
Based on Firm Level Data
Claim Type
Total Claims Health-Care 
Only
Short-term
Disability
Long-term
Disability
Participation   41,850.63**
      (2.50)
   841.34**
    (2.33)
 12,858.62*
     (1.69)
  41,528.98
      (0.36)
Benefits   –1,980.14
      (0.63)
     3.62
    (0.05)
 –3,552.83**
     (2.47)
   2,125.57
      (0.09)
Benefits Squared        3.37
      (0.71)
    –0.043
    (0.41)
      6.43***
     (3.01)
     –10.79
      (0.33)
Wages      187.70
      (0.48)
    16.27**
    (1.96)
    374.74**
     (2.11)
   3,038.62
      (1.30)
Payroll
(‘000000)
       0.0006
      (0.19)
     9.41E-06
    (0.16)
      0.0002
     (0.12)
      –0.0002
      (0.04)
Payroll Squared       –6.92E-13
      (0.13)
    –1.23E-14
    (0.13)
     –2.1E-13
     (0.10)
       7.63E-13
      (0.08)
Payroll Growth –166,261.90***
      (6.92)
–2,756.05***
    (5.26)
–92,241.20***
     (8.50)
–135,661.20***
      (0.62)
Unemployment
Rate
   2,950.36
      (0.99)
   127.92***
    (2.06)
  2,726.96
     (2.04)
  –7,491.85
      (0.38)
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.  * denotes significance at 10 percent level. 
** denotes significance at 5 percent level.  *** denotes significance at 1 percent level.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we examined a natural experiment, whereby experience 
rating of workers’ compensation assessments was introduced to a group 
of employers in British Columbia. The unambiguous results from our 
study are that experience rating reduced the incidence of claims where 
only health care interventions were required (but no time was lost from 
work) and short-term disability claims. Evidence from the analyses based 
on firm-level data suggests that per claim costs increased following the 
introduction of experience rating, indicating that experience rating may 
have its greatest impact on reducing relatively less severe claims (at least 
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as measured by the cost of the claim). However, this result is not robust 
when the data are aggregated to the industry level. Therefore, we cannot 
be confident regarding the impact of experience rating on average claims 
costs from our study.
We summarize our key findings as follows:
• The introduction of experience rating resulted in a reduction in the 
frequency of the total claims rate, and among the claim types, in a 
reduction in the frequency of health care only and short-term dis-
ability claims.
• There is no evidence that experience rating reduced the frequency 
of fatal injury claims.
• Long-term disability claims frequency increased after the  introduction 
of experience rating.
• There is no evidence that experience rating influences the duration 
of absences from work.
• Average costs per claim, and per 1,000 for health care only claims, 
increased after the introduction of experience rating, but we did not 
obtain any statistically significant estimates (from our preferred 
analysis) that the costs associated with other claim types changed 
after the introduction of the program.
It would appear that even very modest financial incentives, such as 
those in British Columbia, can result in a reduction in claims, at least for 
relatively minor injuries. However, our study does not allow us to attribute 
this reduction in claims frequency to investments in health and safety or 
claims management behaviour.
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RÉSUMÉ
La tarification par incidence, les accidents du travail et le coût 
des prestations : quelques données récentes
L’indemnisation des travailleurs victimes d’une maladie professionnelle 
ou d’un accident du travail est un régime d’assurance sociale qui couvre 
les soins médicaux, la réhabilitation professionnelle et les prestations en 
espèces. Elle prévoit également des prestations en espèces pour les familles 
des travailleurs décédés au travail. Semblables à d’autres programmes 
 gouvernementaux d’assurance sociale, ces prestations sont financées par une 
taxe prélevée sur la liste de paie de l’employeur. Cependant, contrairement 
à d’autres programmes, le taux retenu varie d’un employeur à l’autre en 
fonction étroite des coûts encourus par les réclamations.
L’appréciation du taux de cotisation des employeurs à l’assurance obéit 
à un processus qui se déroule en deux étapes. D’abord, l’entreprise est placée 
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dans un taux de groupe, qui reflète les risques sous-jacents d’accident, de 
sorte que les entreprises qui présentent des risques semblables sont cotisées 
selon le taux d’un même groupe. Les taux de groupes sont habituellement 
basés sur le secteur industriel, reflétant ainsi la croyance à l’effet que les 
salariés d’un même secteur sont exposés aux mêmes risques. Un taux de 
« base » ou « manuel » est établi pour chaque groupe selon l’historique 
des réclamations collectives de toutes les entreprises qui appartiennent à ce 
groupe. Plus précisément, le taux « plancher » est fonction de l’historique 
des coûts des réclamations récentes de l’ensemble du secteur. Ensuite, le 
taux de base se voit modifié selon l’historique d’accident d’une entreprise 
particulière. Les entreprises qui présentent une « situation désastreuse » vont 
payer un taux proportionnellement plus élevé que le taux plancher, alors 
que les entreprises qui présentent un dossier favorable vont payer un taux 
plus bas. Ces ajustements renvoient à ce qui est connu sous l’expression 
de tarification par incidence et on les retrouve couramment dans bien des 
régimes d’assurance.
En associant plus étroitement les évaluations de prime aux coûts des 
réclamations, la tarification par incidence crée une incitation financière à 
améliorer les conditions de santé et de sécurité sur les lieux de travail et 
elle se présente maintenant comme la pierre angulaire de la législation en 
matière de santé et de sécurité au travail en Amérique du Nord. Comme 
une autre possibilité, la tarification par incidence peut aussi intensifier les 
incitations à réduire les coûts des réclamations par le biais d’un type de 
comportement quant à la gestion des réclamations, qui se traduit par le fait 
que les employeurs ont recours à d’autres moyens (au lieu d’investir dans la 
santé et la sécurité) de réduire la fréquence et les coûts des réclamations.
Des recherches, qui ont tenté d’évaluer l’effet de la tarification par 
 incidence sur la fréquence et les coûts des accidents du travail, ne  démontrent 
pas de façon constante qu’une réduction des taux de réclamation ou des 
coûts sont associés à cette forme de tarification. Plusieurs études antérieures 
portant sur la tarification par incidence ont rencontré des difficultés au 
plan de la cueillette de données, incluant l’absence de mesures directes 
de l’évaluation de la tarification, de données à l’échelle de l’entreprise et
de trop petits échantillons. Ces difficultés viennent miner la confiance que 
les chercheurs et les législateurs peuvent accorder aux conclusions des 
recherches existantes.
Cet essai évalue l’effet de l’introduction de la tarification par incidence 
en matière d’indemnisation sur les employeurs en Colombie-Britannique en 
recourant à des données longitudinales. Notre ensemble de données mesure 
les fréquences et les coûts des réclamations avant et après l’introduction 
du nouveau programme de tarification et nous permet de rendre compte de 
l’impact d’autres facteurs qui peuvent influencer les taux et les coûts des 
réclamations dans le temps.
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Les données utilisées ici proviennent d’un dossier créé par la 
 Commission des accidents du travail de la Colombie-Britannique. Cette 
base de données des entreprises, pour la période allant de 1983 à 1992 
inclusivement, a été construite en utilisant les archives administratives de 
la Commission des accidents du travail et elle contient de l’information 
quant au nombre et aux coûts des réclamations par type, quant à la liste 
de paie imposable, la participation ou non de l’entreprise au programme 
de  tarification par incidence et le taux du groupe auquel l’entreprise 
 appartient. De plus, la Commission a fourni l’information sur le taux de 
salaire moyen de l’industrie. Quatre types de réclamation ont été évalués : 
(1) des réclamations où le client n’a pas connu d’invalidité au travail, par 
conséquent, il n’a reçu que les indemnités en matière de soins de santé ;
(2) des réclamations où le demandeur a connu une période de courte 
 invalidité, sans cependant qu’elle soit suivie d’une invalidité permanente ; 
(3) des réclamations où le demandeur a vécu une incapacité de longue 
période (permanente) ; (4) des accidents mortels. Nous avons également 
considéré le taux global de réclamations. Pour n’importe lequel type de 
réclamation, le taux représente le nombre annuel d’un type particulier
de réclamation par 1000 travailleurs.
Le calcul du taux de réclamation est effectué à l’aide de la version 
« panel » du modèle de régression de Poisson. En plus de ce calcul, nous 
avons évalué le coût moyen par réclamation à l’aide des régressions établies 
pour chaque type de réclamation et nous avons également calculé les 
régressions pour la durée moyenne des réclamations d’invalidité à court 
terme. Pour ce genre d’analyse, nous avons eu recours à des procédures de 
régression de l’ordre des effets fixes des moindres carrés généralisés. Notre 
variable explicative principale au cœur de ces analyses est une  variable
nominale qui nous indique le moment où le programme de tarification 
par incidence est mis en application. Nos modèles incorporent aussi des 
 variables de contrôle pour les salaires et les avantages sociaux hebdoma-
daires, la liste de paie de l’entreprise, la croissance du volume de cette 
dernière ; enfin, le taux de chômage dans l’industrie chez les personnes de 
sexe masculin dans la force de l’âge.
Les conclusions qui se dégagent clairement de notre étude démontrent 
que la tarification par incidence réduit la fréquence des réclamations dans 
les cas où seulement des interventions en matière de soins de santé sont 
requises (mais sans perte de temps au travail) et dans les cas de réclamations 
pour une invalidité de court terme. Les conclusions quant aux coûts des 
réclamations ne sont pas aussi évidentes. Les évaluations obtenues à l’aide 
de notre analyse ne permettent pas d’affirmer que l’introduction de cette 
tarification a été suivie d’un impact statistiquement significatif sur les coûts 
de la plupart des réclamations. Cependant, nous avons décelé un accroisse-
ment des coûts associés aux réclamations pour les soins de santé.
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Nos conclusions se présentent de la manière suivante : (1)  l’introduction 
de la tarification par incidence s’est traduite par une réduction de la 
 fréquence du taux global de réclamations pour les soins de santé et dans 
les cas d’invalidité à court terme ; (2) il n’y a aucune preuve à l’effet que 
la tarification par incidence réduise la fréquence des réclamations dans les 
cas d’accidents mortels ; (3) les réclamations dans les cas d’invalidité à long 
terme se sont accrues après l’adoption du programme de tarification ; (4) il 
n’est pas prouvé que le programme ait un impact sur la durée des absences 
du travail ; (5) les coûts moyens par réclamation et par 1000 travailleurs 
n’ont pas été affectés par l’adoption de la tarification par incidence, sauf 
dans le cas des réclamations pour soins de santé seulement.
En somme, nos calculs indiquent que des incitations d’ordre monétaire 
très modestes, comme celles qu’on rencontre en Colombie-Britannique, 
peuvent se traduire par une réduction des réclamations, du moins dans le 
cas d’accidents relativement mineurs. Cependant, nos observations ne nous 
permettent pas d’attribuer cette réduction de la fréquence des réclamations à 
des investissements en santé et en sécurité ou au comportement en matière 
de gestion des réclamations de la part des entreprises.
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